In one of her first official acts as governor of Virginia, Abigail Spanberger moved quickly to unwind a cornerstone of her predecessor’s immigration enforcement strategy.
On January 17, the newly inaugurated Democratic governor signed an executive order rescinding former Republican Gov. Glenn Youngkin’s directive that state and local law enforcement agencies “cooperate” with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under Section 287(g) agreements and related cooperative frameworks.
Spanberger’s order, part of a slate of ten “Day One” executive orders, drew sharp partisan reactions. Supporters of the repeal cast it as an effort to refocus limited state police resources on core public safety duties rather than federal civil immigration enforcement. Critics, including senior Republicans in Virginia, warned it could hamper efforts to remove noncitizens who’ve committed serious crimes.
Rescission vs. Restriction: The Legal Reach of an Executive Order
It’s important to understand what Spanberger’s action does and doesn’t do. An executive order, in Virginia as in other states, does not create primary law. It operates as a managerial directive to agencies under the governor’s control. As such, Spanberger’s repeal eliminates a state mandate for cooperation with ICE — but it does not prohibit cooperation altogether, nor does it alter federal immigration law. ICE retains all of its federal authority to enforce immigration statutes in Virginia.
What Spanberger’s order does is withdraw the governor’s imprimatur and directive that state forces prioritize or be compelled into roles supporting federal immigration enforcement. State police and corrections officers are now free to decline automatic involvement in 287(g) partnerships without running afoul of a state policy that previously nudged them into those roles.
Federal Authority vs. State Discretion
Under longstanding constitutional doctrine, immigration enforcement is a federal responsibility. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that while states cannot independently craft their own immigration regimes or obstruct federal enforcement, those same federal authorities cannot compel states to administer federal law. That principle — the anti-commandeering doctrine — undergirds much of the legal space in which this policy shift operates. States may volunteer assistance, but they cannot be forced to do so.
Youngkin’s 2025 order had expressly directed the Virginia State Police and the Department of Corrections to enter into 287(g) agreements with ICE — mechanisms by which state or local officers can be federally deputized to do limited immigration enforcement under ICE supervision. Critics at the time argued the order blurred the line between state policing and federal immigration enforcement, and risked driving immigrant communities farther from law enforcement trust.
Operational Impact: Cooperation Without a Mandate
On the ground, the repeal is likely to change the shape of cooperation, even if it doesn’t eliminate it. Without a state directive encouraging 287(g) arrangements, agencies may be less inclined to pursue such agreements proactively. That could mean fewer troopers formally trained and deputized under ICE supervision, and less routine exchange of information about noncitizens in custody.
But ICE retains the ability to operate in the Commonwealth. Federal immigration officers can still make arrests, serve warrants, detain individuals, and pursue removals under federal law. Courts have upheld that ICE’s authority stems from federal statutes and regulations, not state orders. What changes is the predictability and institutional force behind state participation.
Public Safety, Resources, and Litigation Risk
Spanberger and allies frame the repeal as a reallocation of scarce law enforcement resources toward core public safety functions — investigating crime, staffing jails, community policing — instead of federal civil enforcement. Spanberger’s statement at the time emphasized that federal authorities “should enforce federal civil immigration laws.”
Civil liberties advocates have welcomed the move as a step toward reducing fear and mistrust in immigrant communities, which some studies suggest can deter reporting of crime when local police are closely tied to immigration enforcement. The ACLU of Virginia called the order “the first step to make sure Virginia law enforcement is not a tool for ICE.”
Opponents argue that retreating from formal cooperation could complicate efforts to identify and remove noncitizens convicted of serious offenses, though data on the actual public safety impact of 287(g) arrangements vary and are contested. Some analyses suggest a significant portion of detentions under cooperative regimes involve individuals without criminal histories.
Looking Forward: Litigation and Legislative Paths
Legally, executive orders are inherently fragile — they can be rescinded by successors. Spanberger’s repeal underscores that fragility and highlights how immigration policy at the state level can swing sharply with political turnover. Future governors could revive cooperation directives or pursue legislative action to codify aspects of enforcement assistance.
Litigation could also emerge if localities or law enforcement unions challenge aspects of cooperation or non-cooperation, but the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering jurisprudence suggests states generally have wide discretion in managing their own law enforcement priorities absent conflicts with federal law.
Spanberger’s repeal recalibrates Virginia’s stance toward federal immigration enforcement — encouragement and mandate are out, discretion and federal primacy are in. It is an important policy signal with operational consequences, but it does not strip ICE of authority or fundamentally alter federal immigration law. It underscores how much of state-level immigration policy hinges on political will as much as legal doctrine.
